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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was originally brought to determine the location 
of a boundary line between property owned by Plaintiffs and 
property owned by Defendants. Since the location of that 
bounJary line hinged on the location of the northeast corner of 
the Lot 12, Block 34 of the Providence Farm Survey, and in an 
attempt to limit and simplify the issues at trial, all parties 
nutually stipulated to waive all other claims and to proceed to 
trial on the sole issue of the location of the lot corner, which 
would in turn establish the south boundary line of Defendants' 
property and the north boundary line of Plaintiffs' property. 
The Parties further stipulated that the prevailing party was 
entitled to judgement for monetary damages in the amount of 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents agree in principal with Appellants' statement 
rPq~rding the disposition of the case in the lower court. 
STATEMENT Of FACTS 
Defendcints purchased the property which is thL· suh i''' m,1 t t r:>r 
P 1ilint1 ·, of the above-entitled action in 1967. (TV.11. p.74,1.111) 
purchased land adjoining Defendants' property on DefPnd~nts' 
southern and eastern boundaries in 1969. (TV.I, p.13, 1.12-22) 
At the time Plaintiffs purchased the property, they were awcire of 
a possible boundary dispute or at least the existence of some 
problems with the boundary location. (TV.I, p.14, 1.18-21, p.35, 
1.3-13) Shortly after purchasing their property, Plaintiffs began 
making claims that the fence on Defendants' southern boundary was 
not the actual boundary line, claiming that the boundary line was 
actually north of the existing fence extending into property 
owned by Defendants. 
Plaintiffs eventually filed this law suit. Thereafter, 
Defendants hired a registered land surveyor, Randy Bott, of 
Century Sur"eyors, to survey the property to determine the actual 
boundary. As a result of that survey (often referred to as the 
"Bott Survey"), it was discovered that the original northeast 
corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey, which was the 
beginning point of reference for Plaintiffs' legal description, 
was not where Plaintiffs had claimed it to be. The original 
northeast corner of Lot 12 was 33 feet south of where Plaintiffs 
claim the northeast corner to be. (TV.IL p.125, 1.3-15) 
Defendants thereby discovered that their property not only went 
to the fence on the southern boundary, but ext0ndf'd a few feet 
beyond (south) the existing fence. 
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c~xcept for the loc<ition of the northeast corner of Lot 12, 
1 '-' -1·. ~·' 4, ~rovidence Farm Survey, all other matters were 
1~tPd to by the parties at trial. Pursuant to the 
,, if''J1.·it1on of the: parties, the only matter for determination by 
1 '" :1ury wcis the location of the northeast corner, which would in 
· urr1 ;'1etPrminc: the actual boundary line between the properties 
- ·.-.·ried tJy Defendants and Plaintiffs. 
:'he :;ury, after hearing the facts, evidence and testimony, 
to1c11ch primarily consisted of testimony from four expert 
~1tnesses; Ken Spires and Clyde Naylor testifying on behalf of 
tJ;dnt1ffs, cind Rcindy Bott and Louis Hickman testifying on behalf 
,f Defendants) determined that the northeast corner of Lot 12 
~as located where Defendants claimed it to be. (Verdict of the 
,cJry, !Jistrict Court Record, p. 52) Plaintiffs then filed a 
'·lot inrt for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New 
Trial. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' Motion and ordered 
n~· Judgement be entered according to the verdict of the jury. 
i\l··i:,or'"n'1um Decision, District Court Record, pp. 92, 93; Order, 
l·1st r l ct Court Record, p. 100; See also Defendants' Memorandum in 
'l'"''s1t1on to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding 
ti«? \'E"rdict) Plaintiffs then appealed this matter to the Supreme 
•),1rt nf the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO A JURY TRIAL. 
A quick review nf the Jaw on a party's right to a jury trial 
in a quiet title action indicr-it-0s thnt m,1ny sl,1t1'S (lr1 r:,it ,-1] lo'...; ,-1 
trial by jury for such actions. However, Utrlh has lon'J since 
decided that il party to a quiet title action hcis a risht to 
demand a jury trial. In Holland v. Wilson, 327 r.2d 2S1-,, 252 
(Utah 1958) this court stated: 
We are further of the opinion that although historically 
an action to quiet title was originally equitable and 
the law courts had no jurisdiction to grant such 
relief, that situation does not prevail in this case. 
Formerly the equity courts afforded relief because 
there was no adequate remedy at law. In this 
jurisdiction, however, there is an adequate remedy 
provided by statute under the provisions of chapter 40 
of title 78 U.C.A. 1953. Likewise in tl11s state the 
distinctions between law and equity actions have heen 
abolished by Article VIII. Sec. 19, of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
We are further of the opinion that the right to a Jury 
trial in this type of case is assured by Section 78-21-1, 
U.C.A. 1953 which declares: 
Right to jury trial. - In actions for the 
recovery of specific real or persoral property, 
with or without damages .... an issue of 
fact may be tried by jury, unless a jury trial 
is waived . 
The Holland case was an action by the plaintiff to quiet 
title to certain unpatented mining claims. In its pretrial, the 
trial court had designated as an issue of fact the question of 
whether the defendants had done assessment work for the year 
ending July 1, 1954 on the claims invol•;eu in the law suit. The 
trial court had refused the plaintiff's request for a Jury 
trial, and on appeal the only quest ion to he dee tdPd by the 
Utah Supreme Court was whether or not Plaintiffs Ind cin ahS1)ltJte 
r i g h t t o h a v e th e i s s u e s o f f a c t d e t e r m i n e d h y a : ir y " lh' n ,1 
proper demand was made therefor. 
the opinion that there can no longer be any guestton as to tl115 
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l i qh t." :i2-; r./,l ,·,t ~51. The Supreme Court further said: 
It 1s our opinion that the above language [refering to 
Section 78-21-1 U.C.A. 1953], if given reasonable and 
rational construction, must be interpreted as 
declarin9 that all issues of fact relating to possession 
of specific real and personal property may be determined 
by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. 327 P-2d at 252. 
The instant case, as designated in Appelants' brief, is an 
action to quiet title to real property. The only issue put to 
the jury for the jury's determination was purely a factual issue, 
that being the factual location of the northeast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey. At trial, Plaintiffs 
contended that the original northeast corner had moved and 
changed from where it had been placed and that by usage and 
history the original northeast corner became the corner of the 
Larsen fence. Defendants contended that the original northeast 
corner did not move; that it was located where the plats, 
surveys, deeds and other records indicated it would be, i.e. 
1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 
34. All of the evidence presented to the jury, which included 
the location of fences, monuments, possession lines, surveys, 
plats, deeds, techniques used in surveying, historical and common 
usage, etc., was presented in an attempt to convince the jury of 
the true location of that northeast corner, which was purely a 
factual issue properly put to the jury for its determination. 
II. 
THC JURY'S VERDICT MUST STAND UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY SHOWN 
THAT TllCRC WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE t:VlUENCE TO 
JUSTIFY THE VERDICE AS GIVCN. 
lJtcJh case law is rich with authority detililing the scope of 
t C'Jiew irn·l tl1e Supreme Court's right to overturn the jury's 
verctict. Those c -1. s es pr 1 n 1 ~ l p -1 1 1 y d t •. 1 l ~ ... ; l t ] 1 t h' J[!,11 11,1 >I 
evidencA ~-.rh1ch is required to sup[Jnrt the Jllt'/'s \lf_'11J1,·t 1r1,J in 
whose favor the evictence must be viewed. The f() I l uw 1 ri<_r ( .1 st~s 
are a synopsis of rulings on this issue from the Ut>1h Suprc_-mc• 
Court: 
Ute - CAl Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utcih, 
605 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1980): In viewing this evidence, 
this Court will upset the jury verctict only upon a 
showing by the appealing party that the evidence so 
clearly preponderates in his favor reasonable people 
could not differ on the outcome of the case. Also in 
determining if there was sufficient evidence to support 
the Jury's verdict this Court will consider those facts 
which most strongly support the verdict and where there 
is anv conflict in the evidence this Court will 
consider as true that evidence which supports the 
verdict. 
Gilhespie v. DeJong, Utah, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (1974): 
This case falls within these pronouncements we have 
often made: that the parties appear to have had what 
they are entitled to: a full and fair opportunity to 
presen~ their contentions, and the evidence supporting 
the:n, t:c the court and jury, and to have a verdict ancl 
judgment entered thereon. When this has been done, all 
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the 
verdict and Judgment; and this court will not distrurb 
them unless there is substantial and prejudicial error, 
absent which there is a reasonable likelihood that 
there would have been a different result. 
Gessner v. Dairymen Associates, Inc., Utah, Gll P.2d 
713, 715 (1980): This Court assumes the jury believed 
those aspects of the evidence which sustain the 
findings and the judgment, and therefore makes its 
analysis of the case and draws its conclusions on the 
basis of the facts so found. 
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. 
Foy & Sons, Inc., Utah, 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1983): It 
is the prerogative of the jury to resolve issues of 
fact, and the accepted rules of appellate review 
preclude this Court from substituting its judgment for 
that of the jury on issues of fact. On appeal, we view 
the evidence in the light most supportive of the 
verdict, and assume that the Jury believed those 
aspects of the evidence which sust~in its findings and 
judgment. We will upset a Jury verdict only upon .1 
(, 
shr)v.·in'l th;;jt_ th!;:-' 0v1,ll'rJC•~ so clearly preponderates in 
f o'J'·t -~f lh• "l'f'''' 1 iHct ·.nill reasonable people would not 
r11ffer ,:-Jr! thi.:· c,utc,:)r~1"::' of the case. 
G,r 1:1 '-'~ T r ' - u - J n c . , U t a h , t 6 7 P 2 d 5 9 8 , 6 O l ( l 9 8 3 ) : 
I t 1 s l he ex c J us : '.' e u r u v 1 n c e of the jury to determine 
the credibility c 1 ~ ttie v.1 1tn>-.;sses, weigh the evidence, 
,nd mc,f:•_· f1n•iJr1ns of fac·t. l-.'1 l liams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 
= d .c; ~ 7 , ~ ~ '' - j (', .; 1 ~ I . ~ d le L , l G ~ i I CJ 6 5 } ; Joseph v. 
W.ll. CrCl'Jes Lcettel-Lioy S,c,1n~s Hosp1tcd, 10 Utah 2d 94, 
9'?-10(1, ..'.'-tL !'.~Ci ci,:;~, 93f) (J=lGCJ). Vihere the evidence 
:s conf] ic<-1r1~ ancJ lht...· Ju1·y 1s properly instructed, we 
io not upset ttrose findings of fact on appeal except 
_;} 1 on ::i sh c• v..· i n ~_; th "i t t rt t_· ~ \' :;_ , le r 1 c e 1 --.,· i e w e d 1 n the 1 i g ht 
@ost favorable to the verdict, so clearly preponderated 
in appel ldnt's fd\'Dr tt1CJt reasonable persons could not 
.11ffer on the outcome :if tCJe case. Ute-Cal Land 
[•e\·elopment Corp. v. ~>rthe':", !_'tan, GC•S P.2d 1240, 1245 
(l"CC•); Nelson v. Watts, Utcd1, SC:O P.2d 798, 799 
( 1 q '77) . 
1::,'ich of the above-ci tPL! cases holds, in essence, that the 
Supreme Court must view lhe ev:dence in a light most favorable to 
:he :-ionr:io'.·1:-ig p::i.rty, ::he Respondcn:t, and that the verdict of the 
]--1::-y cari only be D\·er-turned if, Jn \'le1A1 ing the evidence in a 
l 1~h1=- G,ost fa':::JrablL· -.::.o thf-' R':>spDndarit, the court finds that 
:~·1er':"' is ;io subs:.ari::.10~ basis in :.:.he evidence which would support 
•_11...:. J:....:r1·'s vc::r.Jic,_ o~ that t:-1erc· w·2.1s subst:::intial and prejudicial 
·~tror, i,...;1thout v.1hich ~-here is a r<?dSOt:C:ible 11klihood that there 
ll I. 
'l'Hl::RE IS CO~JSIDl::R.".i3LE .4'.:D SL:BST,',~JTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S ~CR~JCT 
In his Memorandum Decision denying Appellant's Motion for 
ld,]13vmcnt Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial, the 
llc•11urahl•' Omc'r J. Cal 1, trial JUdge in the instant action, 
... suffice> it to s'y thilt in the court's opinion 
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there was substantial compct(~nt cv1JenL·,_. to susL.1111 th~·, 
jury's verdict and therefore the Plaintiffs' Motl<)[1 for 
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict Or In TltP 
Alternative For ,\ Retrial should br> rl<>nied. The 1·nurt 
regurds the jury's decision ilS affecting thP North 
South boundary line between these parties, and thn othPr 
results stipulated to by the parties. (Memorandun Decision, 
District Court Record, p. 93) 
The evidence referred to by the trial court consists 
primarily of Mr. Bott's survey (Exhibit 8), the Martineau 
Plat (Exhibit 1), the 1896 plat (Exhibit 30) the map of the 
Providence township (Exhibit 35) the Cache County Plat 
(Exhibit 2), the Albern E. Allen Abstr'lct (Exhibit 37) which 
included numerous deecls, testimony from Randy L. Bott, Cl 
registered land surveyor, and testimony from Louis Hickmi'ln, a 
licensed engineer, land surveyor and certifred abstractor. 
In order to appeal the admissibility of evidence presented 
at trial, Appellants i'lre required to make a timely objection i'lt 
the time of trial. Appellants i'lccepted both clr. Bott and Mr. 
Hickman as expert witnesses (TV.II, p.106, 1.18: TV.III, p.S, 
1.19) and did not object to the evidence presented by Defendants 
and received by the trial court. In Lict, it 1-Jas Plaintiffs who 
introduced the Martineau Plat and the Bott Survey into evidence. 
Plaintiffs cannot now attack the evidence presentecl by Defendants 
as unlawful, unfounded, or invalid or attempt to SilY what 
evidence is better than other evidence. It is the sole pcovince 
of the jury to determine the credibility of the 1-ntnessces and 
exhibits and to weigh in their own minds the value of th!'> 
testimony presented by both sides. E. A. St r,JUt West~rn R0<1 l ~ 
..... 
Cintron ''· Milkovich, Utah, 611 P.2d 730, 732 (1980). Once 
the jury has weighed the evidence and entered its verdict, the 
,,u!e issue on appeal is to determine if there is any reasonable 
hasis in the evidence to support the jury's verdict or if there 
.ere subtantial and prejudicial errors, without which there is a 
reasonable likaihood the jury's verdict would have been 
J1 f ferent. In the instant case there is ample evidence to 
support the decision and there were no substantial and 
)'H'JUd1cial errors committed at trial. Even if there were errors 
cummi':ted at trial, it is unlikely the Jury's verdict would have 
been any different. 
Mr. Bott testified that the record distance, according to the 
Martineau survey and other plats and deeds, from the south line 
,,f Lot. 12 (which is a known line agreed to by all parties) to 
Lhe center line of 7th South Street was 2,065.23 feet (TV.II, 
i·-119, J.25) and that he measured the distance on the ground as 
~, C> C 5 • 5 S feet. (TV. I I , p. 1 2 0, 1. 1 ) Mr. Sp i er s ( expert w i t n es s 
fur the Plaintiff) testified that the measured distance from the 
souLh line of Lot 12 to the center line of 7th South was 2,067 feet 
(T\'.I, p.78, 1.20-23; TV.I, p.82, 1.8-12; TV.I, p.84, 1.5-11) 
which is 1.77 feet farther than the record measurement called 
fJr in the ancient plats. Mr. Bott also testified that the 
record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12, which is 
hJl•,ed by all parties to be a known location, to the northeast 
··rner of lot 12 was 1320 feet (TV.II, pl22, 1.20-25); that the 
"' l•pncJl and subsequent plats and surveys called for a 66 foot 
road (4 rods) and that the distance from the southeast corner of 
') 
Block 8 to 700 South Slreel wc1s (,GO feel. (TV.JI, f>.1)2, 1.14) 
Several witnesses testified thilt the measured d1sL1ncc, from tl1•c 
southeast corner of Lot 12 to the present soulh line of 800 South 
(or what has been referred to in the trial as the Lilrsen fence and 
claimed by Plaintiffs as the northeast corner of lot 12) is 
approximately 1350.5 to 1354.5 feet (TV.I, p. 82, 1.12; TV.II, p. 
63, 1.20; TV.II, p.121, 1.6), and that the distance from the 
Larsen fence, on the present south side of 800 south to the fence 
on the north side of 800 South was 33 feet. Mr. Bott testified 
that the record distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to 
the south line of lot 8, which is the north side of the present 
800 south street, is 1320 feet plus 66 feet or 1386 feet. 
(TV.I, p.49, 1.16-18; TV.II, p. 39, 1.12-22; TV.II p. 125, 1.10-
11) The measured distance from the southeast corner of lot 12 to 
the south line of lot 8, or the north side of 800 South was 
measured by Mr. Bott to be 1386 feet, (TV.II, p.122, 1.20-25, p. 
123, 1.1-6) which completely agrees with the record distances 
established in the ancient plat surveys; was measured by Mr. 
Spires to be 1387.5 feet (TV.I, p.82, p.84, 1.11) for a diference 
of 1.5 feet; and was measured by Mr. Naylor to be 1386.S feet, 
(TV.II, p.63, 1.20, p. 39, 1.21-22) for a difference of .S feet. 
Mr. Bott concluded therefrom, and so testified, that lot 12 
had been laid out on the ground as a lot 1320 feet north and 
south by 660 feet east and west, that a 66 foot road had been 
laid out between lot 12 and lot 8, and that the south line of lot 
8 was laid out to be 1386 feet from the south line of lot 12. 
(TV.II, p.142, 1.6-21) This was confirmed by the record 
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m~asurements and by actual measurements on the ground. Mr. Bott 
,3lso concluded that the northeast corner of lot 12 was 1320 feet 
directly north of the southeast corner of lot 12, (RV.II, p.125, 
1.3-15) ironically only about 33 feet south of vihere Mr. Spires 
,rnd Mr. Naylor had placed the northeast corner of lot 12 and they 
both allowed for only a 33 foot road instead of 66 feet as called 
for in the ancient plats. 
Mr. Hickman testified that the record distances indicated on 
the ancient plats and the measured distances in the Bott survey 
'Ullaborated one another. (TV.III, p. lS, 1.19-23) Mr. Hickman 
and Mr. Bott each testified that the standard historical distance 
of lots when originally platted and laid out on the ground was 
80 rods by 40 rods (1320 feet by 660 feet), or a quarter of a 
milP by one eighth of a mile, and that a 4 rod (66 foot) road was 
olso the standard viidth for platted roads.(TV.II, p.141. 1.12-25; 
TV.III, p.9, 1.3-24) This standard distance of 1320 feet from the 
southeast corner of lot 12 to the northeast corner of Lot 12 was 
also substantiated by the 1896 plat, (Exhibit 30), the 
Providence tovin map (Exhibit 35) and the official Cache County 
Plat (Exhibit 2). This distance is also well established in the 
original deeds transfering the property. The deeds referenced in 
the Albern Allen abstract (Exhibit 37), beginning with the 
transfer from Milton D. Hammond to Mattie Hansen (number 6 in 
s,1id Abstract) dated January 12, 1877, transfered the "west part 
if the north part of Lot 12, block 34, Plat A, Providence Farm 
Survey," and stated that the dimensions of the parcel were 40 
rods by 20 rods (1660 feet by 330 feet) and contained 5 acres. 
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Mr. Hickman testified thcit the with those st.-,t,,d cl1mcnsions for 
the west part of the north part of Lot 12, the dimensions of the 
entire Lot 12 would be 1320 feet by 660 fecet, (TV.III, p.18, 
1.14-18) which were the platted dimensions on all of afore-
referenced plats. That parcel continued to be a 5 acre parcel, 
40 rods by 20 rods, until Albern Allen deeded a 40 foot strip at 
the bottom (south) of said parcel to Charles Miller, Appellants' 
predecessor in title. Mr. Allen then deeded the remainder of the 
parcel, which was then 620 feet by 330 feet (20 rods) to 
Respondant herein in 1967 who has held title to the property ever 
since. (Exhibit 9) 
As stated earlier, although Plaintiffs/Appellants first 
introduced the Martineau Plat into evidence as Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1 and originally relied on said Plat as the basis for 
their current surveys,(TV.I, p.65, 1.14-17, p.67, 1.3-9) 
Appellants now attempt to disparage and discredit the Martineau 
plat as being an unauthenticated "office survey." It is stated 
in 12 Am Jur 2d, Boundaries, Section 113, that an ancient survey 
made by a competent authority and recorded or accepted as a 
public document, produced from proper custody, is admissible in 
evidence without further verification to prove the location of 
the boundary line. It is further stated in 12 Am Jur 2d, 
Boundaries, Section 115, that an original map, over 30 years olcl, 
found in proper custody, authorized and recognized as ~n off1c1~l 
document, and free on its face of suspicion, is admissible 1n 
evidence as an "ancient document" to prove the location of th<c 
boundary 1 i ne. Certainly the Martineau Plat dated 1880 and the 
12 
(Exh1lllt JIJ) constitute ancient surveys and/or ancient 
: wuments which have been referred to by the witnessess and 
,,
0 )1ecl on by the witnesses and have been recognized as official 
!oruments by the Cache County Recorder. 
The ancient documents, and other maps, plats, and deeds 
r 0 11ed on by the Respondents, and the testimony of Respondents 
~1tnessess constitute substantial creditable evidence more than 
suff i=ient to justify the jury's verdict in favor of Respondents. 
Plct1ntiff's objections to the ancient plats, if given any merit 
at cill, go to the weight of such evidence, not to the 
admissibility of said plats. 
IV. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT AFFECTS ONLY THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO 
ESTABLISH THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THEM AND DOES NOT 
IMPACT SURROUNDING PROPERTY OWNERS 
Throughout the trial and this appeal Appellants have raised 
:•ie emotional and rather imaterial claim that all property owners 
1n the area will be affected by the jury's verdict, even 
sugoesting that boundary lines would have to shifted. To the 
contrary, it is well recognized that the only parties affected by 
:1P decision of the jury are the parties involved in the 
11tigation and the only impact of the jury's decision is to 
letPrmine the location of the lot corner which in turn by 
stipulation determines the boundary line disputed by the parties. 
In Fisl1er v. Davis, 77 Utah 81, 2'll P. 493 (1930), an action 
'•J quiet tJt!e to mininr1 cJ,>ims in 1'/asatch County, the Supreme 
'',JurL ,,f Ut"h stated thdt the decree quieting title to the claims 
would only bind thP parties to the action. 
case had maintained that the Court's decision was in errnr 
because it had been shown at trial that other partiPs may claim 
an interest in the mining claims. This Court held that those 
other parties could still maintain an action regarding the mining 
claims and that the decision to quiet title only affected the 
parties involved. 
In the instant case, the verdict of the jury only decides 
and resolves the boundary dispute between the parties in this 
action and does not locate the northeast corner of lot 12 for any 
other person nor does the jury's decision adversely affect anyone 
else. Appellants' assertion otherwise would require the District 
Court in future actions to ignore the longstanding legal 
doctrines regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
v. 
APPELLANTS CANNOT ASSIGN ERROR TO THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL 
TO GIVE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS WHEN NO OBJECTION WAS ENTERED 
NOR ANY EXCEPTION TAKEN. 
Appellants have continually attempted to assign error to the 
trial court's failure to give certain jury instructions requested 
by Appellant at trial. The Utah Supreme Court has recently 
stated in State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983): 
"Generally for a party to be in a position to complain of the 
trial courts failure to give an instruction, he must first propnse 
the instruction and then take excPption to the courts refusal to 
give it." The Court cited Stcite v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utuh 
1978) wherein this Court had stated: 
Generally, for a party to take advantage of the tri~l 
14 
c-•_1urt 's fa1 lure t<J give full and correct instructions, 
11~· m11st fl rst propose correct instructions, and should 
the ·Dur• f;,i 1 tD give them, to then except thereto. 
-, r - r' . ::: \J a t I J • 
it is furt11er stated in Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil 
'(lur•_·: "n0 part; rc1ay assign the error of giving or failure 
:_,,) ~~J''"-' ar1 instruction unless he objects thereto." 
Appellants failed to enter objections to the trial court's 
ref us" I to gi vrc requested jury instructions in the record and 
!a1led to take exception to Jury instructions given or not given. 
~PP~~ lar1ts now atten1pt to create a record which never existed by 
listing in their brief Jury instructions which may or may not 
r1ave loeen reques'.:cod of the court and by suggesting in their brief 
lr:S~ructions •.-;ere modified by the trial court. Respondants 
Jo nol wish to impune the character or integrity of Appellants or 
the1r counsel, but submit that Appellants cannot be allowed to 
=reale for this appeal a record not in existence when there is no 
nossiblity of acurately establishing what actually transpired at 
t!1e ~rial court level. Appellants must be bound by the record 
,,nd t:-c;nscript prepdred by tt1e duly certified shorthand reporter. 
Furthermore>, dt the hearing re>quested by Appellants to 
settle the record regarding jury instructions held on November 
JS, l "83, more than five months after the trial, Judge Call 
etated that he did recall Plaintiffs' objecting to the court's 
,]lowing a jury trial (Trdnscript of Court Proceedings, November 
I S, I '' 8 3, p. 2 4 , 1. 8- 1 3 ) but a 1 so s ta t e d th a t he had no spec i f i c 
recollection regarding jury instructions (ibid p. 25, 1.1-6) or 
'-hH he hiHJ preclu<l·~·d enyone from excepting to instructions (ibid 
p. 25, 1.6-10). If the tri.,l court car1r1ot m,1ke ~i. (1t_'lt'rn11r1,1t l()n 
regarding proposed Jury instructions, certdinly this Co11rl c<1rrnul 
do so. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellants have failed to show any substantial .1nd 
prejudicial error in the trial proceedings or that the outcome of 
the trial would have been any different if there were errors at 
tr i a 1. 
The essence of Plaintiffs' appeal is a challenge of the 
facts, not the law. The parties at trial mutually s•ipulated to 
waive all other claims and to proceed to trial on the sole 
factual issue of the location of the lot corner. 
Appellants now contend that the Bott Survey and other 
evidence and testimony presented by Respondents at trial was 
illegal, and thus, the Jury's verdict is not supported by lawful 
evidence. Appellants however, failed to timely object to the 
evidence and testimony as being illegal. In fact, Appellants 
introduced some of the evidence relied on by Respondents. 
Since all of the documents and testimony were received 
into evidence by the trial court without objection from 
Appellants, it was then up to the jury to determine the weight and 
credibility they wished to give the evidence and enter a verdict. 
There can no longer be anyquest1on as to the legality of the 
evidence and this court cannot second 3uess the jury in 
attempting to determine how the jury perceiveu the evicl.,nce. The 
Court must assume that the jury believed those aspects <)f th<· 
(','1d»n_·e wh1ch sustn1n the verdict. 
A re\lew uf the record transcript readily reveals that the 
[f::'I itols uf in Appellants' brief are remarkably opinionated. 
;,,ppel !a11ts sub1ectiv<e conclusions of fact merely reinforce the 
princ1pril issue of this case, i.e., the same facts can be viewed 
cl1 £ f Prently by J1 fferent people. Once evidence is received by 
the Court, however, it then becomes the sole province of the trier 
,J( ficct (in this case the Jury) and not the parties to determine 
what is to believed and ;,ccepted, and what is not. 
Jn this action, the Jury chose to believe the evidence which 
supported the Respondents' posit1or,, and so entered their vedict. 
It is respectfully submitted that the verJict is supported by 
substantial eviJence; that no substantial and prejudicial errors 
1·1ere committed at trial; and that any c,::ror which may have been 
rommitted was inconsequential and would not have changed the 
verdict had there been no error. 
Respondents respectfully request that the jury's verdict be 
sustained and that this appeal be dismissed as having no merit. 
DATED this day rif ;•\arch, 1984. 
J Aj:'JE<) C. JENKINS f< ASSOCIATES 
~) ·'/} ~ 
.'L, ~Lzfd---~ 'j,,~Jen Yns1 
Attorney fo : 
Defendants/ espondents 
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